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JEAN ANN ADAMS, Respondent, v. GEORGE BRYAN 
ADAMS, Appellant. 
(1] Husband and Wife - Propert)o Settlement Alreemen.ts. - A 
property settlement agreement between husband and wife is 
valid and binding on the court where it is not tainted by fraud 
or compulsion or is not in violation of the eoDftdential rela-
tionship of the parties. 
[2] Id.-PropertJ' Settlement Agreementa.-A property settlement 
agreement containing support and maintenanee provisions iD 
the nature of alimony is enforceable, if equitable, even though 
not presented to the court in a divorce action. 
[8] Divorce - Permanent AlimoIlJ-!rIodiflcation-Acreement of 
Parties as A1fectiDg. - Where a property settlement agree-
ment containing support and maintenance provisions iD the 
nature of alimony is presented to the court in a divorce action, 
the court haa the power to modify the provisions of alimony 
before or, if the provisions are incorporated in the decree, 
after judgment in accord with its power over alimony gener-
ally. 
l4] Id.-Disposition of PropertJ'-Decree-Modiflcation.-A prop-
erty settlement agreement containing support and maintenanee 
provisions, not in the nature of alimony but as part of the 
division of property, is binding on the court in the abaenee of 
fraud or a violation of the eoDftdential relationship, and after 
decree there can be no modilleation of the payments without 
the consent of the parties. 
[6&, lib] Icl. - Disposition of PropertJ' - meet of ,Aareement of 
Partiea.-A wife's waiver in a property settlement agreement 
of all support and maintenance, or all support and mainte-
D&D.ce except as provided in the agreement, in consideration of 
receiving a more favorable portion of the community property, 
is Dot void 1''' Ie and, in the absence of a showing that the 
agreement was inequitable, the court in a divorce action 
[1] See 8 O&1.Jv. lO-Yr. Supp. 644; 26 Am.Jur. 858. 
[2] lIodi1leation of divorce deeree made on agreement, notes, 
as A.L.B. 639; 109 A..L.Jr.. 1068. See, also, 1 OaLJur. 1081; 17 
Am.Jur.491. 
!rIcx. Die. Beferences: [1, 2] Husband and Wife, § 157; (3] 
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instituted by the wife, _not award her alimony eontrary to 
the agreement. 
[6] ld.-Disposition of Propert7-Uect of Agreement of Parties. 
-WhUe in a c1ivorce action the eourt in its c1iseretion may 
awara the wife necessary alimony (Civ. Code, 1139), luch 
c1iscretion does not empower the trial eourt to modify valid 
agreements of the parties pertaining to the division of their 
propedJ. 
APPEAL from a judgment. of the Superior Court of 
Loa Angeles County. Clarence K. Hanson, Judge. Modi-
fied and aftirmed. 
Action for divorce. Judgment for plaintiff mocli1ied and 
aIlrmed. 
Courtnq A. '1'eel for Appellant. 
David A. Matlin and H. Elliot PownalI, Jr., for Responaent. 
'!'RAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from aninterlocu-
tory judgment of divorce providing for support and main-
tenance of plaintiff until further order of the court. 
PlaintDf and defendant separated. One month later they 
executed a "Property Settlement Agreement" providing for 
the division of all their property and for the support and 
maintenance of plaintiff and . their minor child. Support 
and maintenance were to cease for plaintUf after 18 months 
but were to continue thereafter for the child. The agree-
ment stated that plaintiff, "in view of her akill and train-
ing 88 an. experienced secretary, and by reason of her 
ability to become gainfully employed, particularly waives 
any right to support and maintenance other than, or in ad-
dition to, that provided herein in view of the premiSes and 
in consideration of [defendant's] agreement to transfer and 
assign to [her] the major portion of the community prop-
erty 88 hereinabove set forth." Earlier in the agreement it 
was stated that "except 88 hereinafter specified, each party 
hereto is hereby released and absolved from any and all 
obligations and liabilities for the future acts and duties of r 
the other ••• including all claims of either party upon the \ 
other for support and maintenance 88 wife or husband • • • 
it being understood that this instrument is intended to 






Feb. 1947] ADAMS tI. ADAMS 
[29 C.2d 621; 17' P.2d 265] 
623 
Several months after the execution of this agreement, 
plaintiff sued for divorce on the ground of cruelty. She 
prayed for custody of the child, support and maintenance 
as set out in the agreement, approval of the property settle-
ment agreement, and such other equitable relief as the court 
deemed just. At the trial of the action, which was uncon-
tested, plaintiff stated that she had received her share of 
the property under the agreement, as well as payments of 
support and maintenance, and that the agreement was ac-
ceptable to her. In reply to questions by the court, she re-
vealed that she was not employed at the time of the trial and 
that her husband earned "around $400.00 a month." The 
court then declared, "Call your next witness. The Court is not 
going to approve the property settlement." Plaintiff's counsel 
persisted, however, in showing that plaintiff earned her own 
living before the marriage and that she worked "for a while" 
subsequent to the separation, earning $155 per month. 
The trial court, after completion of the testimony of the 
corroborating witness. inquired whether defendant's counsel 
was in the courtroom. Plaintiff's counsel replied that he did 
not think so but "I know we spent some time to get this 
property settlement. It has been after constant negotiation 
for two months." The trial judge replied that defendant 
should be advised to stipulate to an amendment of the agree-
ment to provide that the $50 per month until further order of 
the court was for the support and maintenance of plaintiff as 
well as the child. "If he refuses to stipulate, serve him with 
an amended complaint in which that is requested in the 
prayer, and at that time this Court will make that order." 
Defendant refused to stipulate to the change and, about 
four months later, plaintiff's motion for leave to file an 
"Amendment to Complaint to Conform to Proof" was heard. 
This amendment added the words "of plaintiff and" to the 
prayer, thereby changing it to read, " ..• and then the sum 
of Fifty Dollars ($50) per month for the support and main-
tenance of plaintiff and of said minor son, Bryan George 
Adams." Defendant's counsel appeared specially to ques-
tion the jurisdiction of the court to allow such an amendment, 
but the motion was granted. The amendment was served on 
defendant and he defaulted. The trial court approved the 
property settlement "except as to the limitation therein with 
reference to the payments of $50.00 per month," awarded 
eustod¥. of the ehild to plaintiff, and awarded support and 
) 
· < 
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maintenance as requested in the amendment to the com-
plaint. Plainti«, therefore, obtained permanent support al-
though the agreement provided for her support for a period 
of 18 months only. 
Defendant Contends that the property aettlement agree.. 
ment is valid and, in the absence of a finding that it is 
inequitable or was procured by fraud or compulson, should 
have been approved by the trial court. We agree with his 
contention. 
[1] Property settlement agreements occupy a favored 
position in the law of this state and are sanctioned by the 
Civil Code. (Hillv. Hill, 23 Cal.2d 82, 89 [142 P.2d 417]; 
HeM!." v. H.MletI, 179 Cal. 284, 287 [183 P. 445] ;Civ. Code 
1158,159.) Such agreements are usually made with the ad-
vice of coUDSel after careful negotiations, and the courts, in 
accord with legislative sanction, prefer agreement rather than 
litigation. (Htu v. Hill, aupra, at p. 89.) When the parties 
have finally agreed upo~ the division of their property, the 
courts are loath to disturb their agreement except for equitable 
considerations. A property settlement agreement, therefore, 
that is not tainted by fraud or compulsion or is not in viola-
tion of the confidential relationship of the parties is valid 
and binding on the court. (Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605, 
614 [160 P.2d 15]; H ogarly v. H ogarly, 188 Cal. 625, 628 
[206 P. 79]; Elfaf. of B.lkMp, 66 Cal.App.2d 644, 651-652 
[152 P.2d 657] j Bazt.f' v. Bazt.f', 3 Cal.App.2d 676, 681 [40 
P.2d 536]; Bf'OIlm v. Bf'OWfI., 83 Cal.App. 74, 82 [256 P. 595]; 
McCa7um v. McCahan, 47 Cal.App. 176, 183 [190 P. 460].) 
[2] The most diftieult problems arising from such contracts 
are those concerning support and maintenance provisions when 
the agreement is presented to the court in a divorce action. 
The parties, upon separation, may agree to provide for sup-
port and maintenance in a variety of ways, which generally 
fall into three categories. The fuost includes contracts in which 
the support and maintenance provisions are in the nature of 
alimony, whether in lump sum or monthly payments, and are 
sep&'8ble from the provisions that divide the property. The 
contract may even provide solely for support and maintenance. 
without reference to a division of property. These contracts, 
if equitable, are enforceable even though not presented to the 
court in a divorce action. (Sanborn v. Sanborn, 3 Cal.App.2d 
437,442 [39 P.2d 830].) [3] If presented to a court in an 
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visions for alimony before or. If the pl'Ovisiona are incor-
porated in the decree. after judgment in accord with ita 
power over alimony generally. (Bough v. Bough, 26 Cal. 
2d 605, 613 [160 P.2d 15].) 
[41 The second category includes. among othel'll, eontraeta 
in which the "support and maintenance" provisions are not 
in the nature of alimony but are part of the division of prop-
erty. This category also includes eontraeta that provide 
solely for the payment of monthly or lump sums f'in lieu of 
community property." Such contraets must be treated like 
other property settlement agreements dealing solely with divi-
sions of property. (EttUnger v. EttUnger, 3 Cal.2d 172, 177-
178 [44 P.2d 540].) If the contract was not fraudulent when 
made, and there was no violation of the confidential relation-
ship. it will be binding on the court and there can be no 
modification of the paymenta after the decree without the 
consent of the parties. (Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833, 
840 [136 P.2d 1].) The court in the divorce action may grant 
alimony to the wife and approve the agreement as well. since 
these agreements purport to deal only with the division of 
the property of the parties. (Civ. Code, § 139; see Puckett 
v. Puckett, .uFO, at p. 841.) It is often diftieu1t to determine, 
in a contract containing provisions for division of property 
and payments of "support and maintenance," whether the 
payments are part of the division of property or are in the 
nature of alimony. "It would be better practice to have that 
determination clearly and concisely made by the trial court 
when it renders the decree of divorce. Considerable con-
fusion and uncertainty could be avoided in that fashion. The 
court could examine the agreement, the ciremnstanees under 
which it was made, and the nature and value of the property 
as related to itR division and the amount of the periodic pay-
ments giving consideration to the statutory rules on the 
subject." (Hqugh v. Hough, suprtJ, at p. 615; Puckett v. 
Puckett, suprtJ, at p. 841.) 
[Gal The third category includes contraets in which the 
wife waives all support and maintenance, or all support and 
maintenance except as provided in the agreement, in eon-
sideration of receiving a more favorable division of the com-
munity property. The court cannot add a provision for ali-
mony to such contraets without changing basiea11y the agree-
ment of the parties as to the division of their property. We 
are confronted with such a aituation in the present ease. 
.. 
) 
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Plaintiif eontends that the trial eourt did not make a new 
property settlement agreement for the parties but approved 
the agreement except for the provision in which she waived 
all support and maintenance. The waiver, it is urged, is 
against public policy and the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion in awarding support and maintenance in the nature 
of alimony. She relies upon Moog v. Moog, 203 Cal. 406 [264 
P. 490], and Smith v. Smith, 94 Ca1..App. 35 [270 P. 463], to 
support this eontention. Moog v. Moog was concern:;d with 
a contract that had been made six years before the action for 
divorce, apparently without advice of counsel. The trial eourt 
ordered alimony as set out in the eontract, but the monthly 
payments were to begin at once despite the fact that the wife 
had already received installments in advance for 14 months. 
The contract contained no waiver and apparently dealt only 
with alimony. In view of the grossly inequitable character of 
the contract, owing to changed circumstances at the time of 
the trial, it was held that the trial eourt acted within its 
power in granting the wife additional alimony. In Smith v. 
Smith the wife executed a release of all her claims for com-
munity property and alimony in eonsideration of the hus-
band'!'! dil!Illissal of an appeal taken by him from the judg-
ment of divorce. It was there held, in affirming the order of 
the tria I court granting alimony, that the release was not 
before the trial court when it made its decree. Alternate 
grounds for the decision were that the release lacked consider-
ation and that it was not a property settlement agreement. 
These two cases do not support plaintiif's contention. The 
contract before the trial court in the present case was clearly 
one that attempted to settle the property rights of the parties. 
It contained a waiver of all other payments in eonsideration of 
her receipt of the major portion of the community property. 
and that waiver was inseparable from the remainder of the 
division of property. A waiver under such conditions is not 
void per .e. (Ex parte Weiler, 106 Ca1.App. 485, 488 [289 
P. 645].) This court has often considered agreements con-
mining similar provisions without expressing disapproval of 
the waiver. (Puckett v. Puckett, 8'Upra, at p. 837; Plummer 
v. Superior Court, 20 Ca1.2d 158, 164 [124 P.2d 5]; Lazar v. 
Superior Court, 16 Ca1.2d 617, 622 [107 P.2d 249]; Ettlinger 
v. Ettlittger, supra, at p. 177; Moran v. Moran, 3 Cal.2d 342, 
343 [44 P.2d 546]; Estate of Boeson, 201 Cal. 36, 40 [255 P. 
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.ham v. Comerford, 96 Cal. 433, 439 (31 P. 358].) In other 
jurisdictions it is generally held that property settlement 
agreements may contain such provisions and, if the agreement 
was valid when made and free from fraud, compulsion or over-
reaching, the partietl are bound by their contraet. (IfI,ter-
Mtional Trust Co. v. Liebhardt, 111 Colo. 208, 214 [139 P.2d 
264, 147 A.T.J.R. 700]; Gore v. Plair, 173 Ga. 88 [159 S.E. 
698, 700]; Beard v. Beard, 53 Idaho 440, 452 [24 P.2d 471; 
Hayden v. Hayden, 215 Ky. 299, 301 [284 S.W. 1073]; West-
fall v. Westfall, 208 Mo.App. 656,659 [236 S.W. 3931; Lee v. 
Lee, 55 Mont. 426, 433 [178 P. 173]; see 1 Nelson on Divorce, 
§ 13.44.) [6] It is true that public policy requires the pro-
tection of the wife and that in a divorce action the court in 
its discretion may award her necessary alimony. (Civ. Code 
§ 139.) Such discretion, however, does not empower the trial 
eourt to modify valid agreements of the parties pertaining to 
the division of their property. The court cannot, 88 was at-
tempted in the present ease, purport to approve the agreement 
and at the same time order payment of support and mainte-
nance contrary to its terms. [5b] Plaintiff now contends 
that the agreement did not actually award her the major part 
of the community property and, since she was not working 
at the time of the trial, the trial eourt acted within its dis-
cretion in awarding her alimony contrary to the agreement 
upon the disclosure of defendant's salary. Plaintiff, however, 
was content with the agreement at the time of the trial and 
presented no evidenee showing that it was unfair, nor was 
any such evidence elieited by the trial court. Her earning 
capacity had not been altered and the circumstances of the 
parties were substantially as they had envisaged them at the 
time they made the agreement. Further, the eourt did not 
set aside the agreement, upon proper showing of fraud, 
compulsion or inequity, nor was there a reconsideration 
of the apportionment of the community property. 
Both parties rely upon Darsie v. Darsie, 49 Cal.App.2d 491 
[122 P.2d 64]; Peck v. Peck, 52 Ca1.App.2d 792 [127 P.2d 
94]; and Eddy v. Eddy, 64 Cal.App.2d 672 [149 P.2d 187]. 
These cases were concerned with decrees granting alimony in 
default actions where there were no requests for alimony in 
the relief prayed for. In each case the relief was found to be 
in excess of that prayed for and the eourt stated that when 
the trial court finds that just.ice requires the payment of 
support money it should set aside the default and authorize 
) 
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the filing and service of an amended complaint containing 
appropriate allegatioDS and prayer for support money, after 
which it would be in a position to include any appropriate 
orders in its decree. That question is not before us in this 
ease. Although the court ordered plaintiff to amend her com-
plaint to request permanent support and maintenance, the 
decree purported to approve the property settlement and 
ordered permanent support contrary to its term&. If the 
court coDSidered the agreement valid it should have given re-
lief in accordance with ita terms. If, on the other hand, it 
had to be set aside upon any valid ground at the time of trial, 
it should not have been made a part of the judgment. (MaiM" 
v. MaiM", 70 Cal.App.2d 619, 626 [161 P.2d 494].) Majon 
v. Majora, aupra, also relied upon by both parties, was con-
cerned with a decree that arbitrarily refused to approve & 
property settlement agreement, and, at the same time, ordered 
permanent support contrary to the terms of the agreement. 
The judgment was reversed because the relief was in excess 
of that prayed for and the trial court was ordered to approve 
the agreement on the grounds that neither had objected to 
its terms and there was no showing of fraud or other in-
validity. The mere order by the trial court in the present 
ease causing the complaint to be amended did not remove the 
incoDSisteney between the agreement and the decree, and the 
reasoning in the Majors ease on that point (MajM" v. MaiM", 
aupra, at 626) is in accord with the reasoning herein. 
The rule that a wife may waive alimony in return for & 
more favorable division of the community property 80 long 
as the agreement was valid when made does not deprive her 
of the protection of the courts. A court in & divorce action 
will carefully scrutinize the agreements, especially where the 
parties did not have the advice of counsel. The wife, after 
being advised of her rights by her attorney, might not wish 
to sign the agreement; if not, she may request that pro-
visions for alimony and the division of the property be 
made by the court in the divorce action. If her eonsent 
to the agreement was procured through fraud or eompul-
&ion, or if eireumstances are such that the court flnds the 
agreement inequitable, the court may withhold approval 
of the agreement. In the present ease the wife agreed 
to waive alimony and accept a major portion of the com-
munity property and payments for a period of 18 months. 
Since nothing was shown to indicate that the agreement 
was inequitable the parties are bound by the agreement. 
) 
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The judgment is therefore modified by ItrikiDg from the 
third paragraph thereof the following: ", except 88 to the 
limitation therein with reference to the payments of $50.00 
per month".and by striking from the fifth paragraph thereof 
the following "of plaintiff and". As 80 modi1led the juc1plent 
is afBrmed. 
Oibaoll. 0.1., Shenk, J., Edmonds. I. Carta; I. Schauer, J., 
aDd Spence, I., eoncurrecL ( ... 
